Personal Injury Representation NJ

Sunday, March 29, 2020

5.40B MANUFACTURING DEFECT

5.40B MANUFACTURING DEFECT (Approved 10/1998; Revised 8/2011)

In a Civil Jury Trial, the Judge will give an outline of the law and how to determine the facts. These are called Jury charges. We find it is a good idea to provide clients with an outline of the law prior to a trial.

Let me give you some applicable concepts which deal with the claim of manufacturing defect, and then I will explain what the plaintiff must prove in order to win in a manufacturing defect case.

A manufacturing defect may be established by proof that, as a result of a defect or flaw which happened during production or while in defendant’s control, the product was unsafe and that unsafe aspect of the product was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s accident/injury/harm.[1]

To establish his/her claim for a manufacturing defect, the plaintiff must prove all of the following elements by a preponderance (greater weight) of the credible evidence:

1. The[product]contained a manufacturing defect which made the product not reasonably safe. To determine if the [product]had a manufacturing defect, you must decide what the condition of the [product]as planned should have been according to defendant’s design specifications or performance standards and what its condition was as it was made. If you find there is no difference between the two conditions, then there was no manufacturing defect. If there was a difference, you must decide if that difference made the [product]not reasonably safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable uses. If the answer is “yes,” then you have found the [product]to be defective. Plaintiff need not prove that defendant knew of the defect nor that defendant caused the defect to occur.

Whether there was a manufacturing defect in the [product]may be shown to you by the [plaintiff]in one of three ways.[2] First of all, it may be demonstrated by direct evidence, such as a defective part. Second, you may infer that there was a defect by reasoning from the circumstances and facts shown. Third, if you find from the evidence that there is no other cause for the accident other than a manufacturing defect, you may find a defect existed.[3]

[Plaintiff]says that the [product]was defective because [insert short factual description of plaintiff’s contention why the product was defective]. [Defendantsays that the [product]was not defective because [insert factual description].

This element may be established by proof that the [product]deviated from the maker’s own design specifications or performance standards.

2. That the defect existed before the [product]left the control of the [defendant].

3. [Use only when misuse or intentional alteration is an issue and use only applicable portion]. That when the accident happened the product was not being misused, or it had not been substantially altered in a way that was not reasonably foreseeable.

[Plaintiff]must prove that at the time of the accident the [product]was being used properly for its intended purposes and for an intended or reasonably foreseeable purpose. To prove this, plaintiff must show that the product was not being misused in a way that was neither intended nor was reasonably foreseeable. In this case the [defendant]contends that at the time of the accident the [product]was being misused. [Set forth a brief factual description of this dispute].

Plaintiff must also show that when he/she used the product, it had not been substantially altered since it left defendant’s control. A substantial alteration is a change or modification made to the product after it was manufactured or sold which both alters the design or function of the product and has a significant or meaningful effect on the product’s safety when used.[4] In this case the defendant contends that the [product)was substantially altered. [Set forth a brief factual description of this dispute]. In considering this issue, you must determine whether there has been a subsequent misuse/abnormal use or substantial alteration to the product. If you find such to exist, you must determine whether such misuse/abnormal use or substantial alteration was reasonably foreseeable at the time the product left the control of the defendant(s).

Reasonably foreseeable does not mean that the particular misuse/abnormal use or substantial alteration was actually foreseen or could have been actually foreseen by [defendant]at the time the [product]left his/her control.

This is a test of objective foreseeability. You may consider the general experience within the industry as to what was known or could have been known with exercise of reasonable diligence when the [product]was manufactured, sold or distributed. Then decide whether a reasonably careful manufacturer, seller or distributor could have anticipated the misuse/ abnormal use or substantial alteration of the [product]. If the alteration reasonably could have been anticipated, and if the alteration made the product not reasonably safe, the defendant is still responsible. [Plaintiff]has the burden to show that a typical manufacturer or seller of the product could foresee that the product would be altered or that despite the alteration the original defect was nonetheless a cause of the injury.[5]

4. That the [plaintiff]was a direct or reasonably foreseeable user, or a person who might reasonably be expected to come in contact with the [product].[6]

5. That the manufacturing defect was a proximate cause of the accident/injury.

Proximate cause means that the manufacturing defect was a substantial factor which singly, or in combination with another cause or causes brought about the accident. [Plaintiff] need not prove that this same accident could have been anticipated so long as it was foreseeable that some significant harm could result from the manufacturing defect. If the manufacturing defect does not add to the risk of the occurrence of this accident [or if there was an independent intervening cause of the accident] and therefore is not a contributing factor to the happening of the accident, then plaintiff has failed to establish that the manufacturing defect was a proximate cause of the accident.

An intervening cause is the act of an independent agency which destroys the causal connection between the effect of the defect in the product and the accident. To be an intervening cause the independent act must be the immediate and sole cause of the accident. In that event, liability will not be established because the manufacturing defect is not a proximate cause of the injury. However, the defendant would not be relieved from liability for its defective product by the intervention of acts of third persons, if those acts were reasonably foreseeable. Where the intervention of third parties is reasonably foreseeable, then there is a substantial causal connection between the product defect and the accident.[7]You must determine whether the [alleged intervening cause]was an intervening cause that destroyed the causal connection between the defective product and the accident. If it did, then the manufacturing defect was not a proximate cause of the accident.

If [plaintiff] has proven each element by a preponderance of the credible evidence, then you must find for [plaintiff].

If, on the other hand [plaintiff]has failed to prove any of the elements, then you must find for the [defendant].

[When there is a jury question dealing with defendant’s affirmative defense or contributory/comparative negligence, the next three questions are applicable.]

6. Was the plaintiff negligent.[8]

[Defendant]contends that [plaintiff]was at fault for the happening of the accident. (Briefly describe contention.)

To win on this defense, [defendant]must prove that [plaintiff]voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a known danger and that [plaintiff’s]action was a proximate cause of the accident. The failure of [plaintiff]to discover a defect in the product or to guard against the possibility of a defective product is not a defense. Rather, to win on this defense [defendant]must prove that [plaintiff]had actual knowledge of the particular danger presented by the [product]and that [plaintiff]knowingly and voluntarily encountered the risk.

7. Was plaintiff’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury?

[See Chapter 6 which deals with Proximate Cause.]

8. Comparative Fault; Apportionment of Fault; Ultimate Outcome.

If plaintiff and defendant both are found to be at fault which is a proximate cause of the accident/injury, the jury must compare their fault in terms of percentages. [See Model Civil Charge 7.31.]

[1]The Products Liability Act defines harm as “physical damage to property, other than to the product itself” and certain personal injuries. N.J.S.A.2A:58C-1(b)(2). Where the claim is for damage to the product itself, the economic loss rule bars tort remedies in strict liability or negligence. See Dean v. Barrett Homes, 204 N.J. 286, 305 (2010) (economic loss rule bars plaintiffs from recovery under the PLA for damage that the Exterior Insulation and Finish System (EIFS) caused to itself, but not to damage caused by the EIFS to the house’s structure or its immediate environs).

[2] Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co.,81 N.J.150, 170 (l979).

[3] Compare Scanlon v. Gen. Motors Corp.,65 N.J.582 (l974), with Moraca v. Ford Motor Co.,66 N.J.454 (1975). This section of the charge should be expanded by relating those principles to the facts of your case. See alsoConsalo v. General Motors,258 N.J.Super. 60 (App. Div. 1992) and Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co.,113 N.J. Super279 (App. Div. l970), aff’d, 59 N.J.365 (1971).

In Myrlak v. Port Authority of New York, et al.,157 N.J. 84 (1999), the Supreme Court held that a res ipsa loquiturcharge ordinarily should not be given in a strict product liability action such as a manufacturing defect case. The Court found that the present charge language “adequately informed the jury that it could rely on circumstantial evidence to ‘infer that there was a defect by reasoning from circumstances and the facts shown”’. Id. at 107. The Court went on to adopt the “indeterminate product defect test” established in Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liabilityas the more appropriate jury instructions in product liability cases which do not involve a shifting of the burden of persuasion. It provides:

It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:

(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of a product defect; and

(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.

[4] See Soler v. Casemaster, Div. of the H.P.M. Corp.,98 N.J.137 (l984); Brown v. United States Stove Co.,98 N.J.155 (l984). Note that an issue of alteration arises only if the particular facts indicate a substantial change relating to the safety of the product. Soler,98 N.J.at 148. Note further that the issue of misuse/abnormal use or substantial alteration, if present in a case, presents considerations bearing upon proximate cause. Id.at 149 Brown, supra,98 N.J.at 171-174. See alsoFabian v. Minster Mach. Co., Inc.,258 N.J. Super.261 (App. Div. 1992).

[5] Brown, supra,98 N.J.at 169.

[6]This may be omitted if not in dispute.

[7] Navarro v. George Koch & Sons, Inc.,211 N.J. Super.588, 573 (App. Div. l986), and Butler v. PPG Industries, Inc.,201 N.J. Super.558, 564 (App. Div. l985), may be understood as discussions of a burden of production rather than persuasion. So construed they clearly conform to Brown v. U.S. Stove,98 N.J.155 (l984) and prior law. See Fabian v. Minster Mach. Co., Inc.,258 N.J. Super261 (at 277 footnote 5) and Johansen v. Mikita USA Inc.,128 N.J.86 (1992).

[8] This defense is not applicable to workplace injuries where the plaintiff, a worker, has performed a task reasonably assumed to be part of the assigned duties. Ramos v. Silent Hoist and Crane Co.,256N.J. Super.467 (App. Div. l992) at 478, Suter, supra,81 N.J.at 167-168; Tirrell v. Navistar, Int’l.,248 N.J. Super. at 401-402. In other than a workplace setting, in a product liability case, plaintiff’s comparative fault is limited to unreasonably and intentionally proceeding in the face of a known danger. Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Company, Inc., supra,76 N.J.at 186. Johansen v. Makita USA, Inc.,128 N.J.86 (l992).

5.40A PRODUCTS LIABILITY — Introduction: Caveats to Judges

5.40A PRODUCTS LIABILITY — Introduction: Caveats to Judges (3/10)

A NOTE TO JUDGE

Caveats

I. Since the passage of the Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 through 7, effective July 22, l987, there is one cause of action for recovery for harm caused by a product. That theory is, for the most part, identical to strict liability as defined by Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co.,81 N.J.150 (l979). The Act explicitly excludes from coverage an environmental tort action as well as actions for harm caused by a breach of an express warranty. SeeSinclair v. Merck & Co., 195N.J.51 (2008) andStevenson v. Keene,131 N.J.393 (l993). Some negligence actions involving products probably survive the Act. SeeCartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of New Jersey,81 N.J.548 (l980), where the manufacturer and the installer of a fire extinguisher system were sued after a fire damaged the property. See Tirrell v. Navistar Int’l., Inc.,248 N.J. Super.390 (App. Div. l991).

II. Adapting this general charge to the specific facts and contentions is critically important in any product liability case. As the Supreme Court advised in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co.,supra at 176 (l979): “The instruction should be tailored to the factual situation to assist the jury in performing its fact finding responsibility.”

The defendant [insert name of defendant]as the manufacturer/seller of a product has the duty1to make/sell a product that is reasonably safe. In this charge when I refer to a reasonably safe product I mean a product that is reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable uses.[2] Defendant [insert name of defendant]owes that duty to direct users of the product, to reasonably foreseeable users of the product, and to those who may reasonably be expected to come into contact with it.

The defendant [insert name of defendant]is liable only if [insert name of the plaintiff]proves that the product causing the harm was not reasonably safe for its intended purpose. In this case the plaintiff [name of plaintiff]claims that the [name of product]was not reasonably safe for its intended purpose because of[3]:

a. a manufacturing defect; or

b. a failure to adequately warn or instruct; or

c. a design defect.

[Each specific defect and the appropriate law dealing with the defect will be discussed in the following charges.]

Source https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/civilcharges.html

More information on Personal Injury cases at http://www.njlaws.com

1 This duty may apply to a defendant independent contractor such as a manufacturer of a component part of a product, or even a rebuilder where the part or product was built according to plans and specifications of the general manufacturer. The standard applied in assessing whether a component part manufacturer can be held liable for a design defect is set forth succinctly in Boyle v. Ford Motor Co., 399 N.J. Super. 18, 24 (App. Div. 2008),certif. denied, 196 N.J.597. The respective contractual responsibilities of defendant manufacturers and producers vis-a-vis component parts and the finished product have no bearing upon the issue of proximate cause. Michalko v. Cooke & Chem. Corp.,91 N.J.386 (l982).

[2] N.J.S.A.2A:58C-2 uses the phrase “not reasonably fit, suitable or safe.” Although this model charge condenses the phrase, and then defines “safe” by including fitness and suitability, individual judges may feel more comfortable using the full phrase. In addition if the phrase “fit” or “suitable” is more appropriate to the facts of the case, those words may be used instead of “safe.” Refer also to Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc.,87 N.J.229, 242 (l981), for warning defect cases; and, generally, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co.,supraat 176.

[3] Charge only the specific defect which is applicable to the case.

5.34 PROPERTY DAMAGE IN MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

5.34 PROPERTY DAMAGE IN MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS (Approved 10/2009; Revised 01/2019)

A. Photographic Evidence

A number of photographs of one or more of the vehicles involved in the accident have been introduced into evidence. These photographs show the damage or depict the condition of the vehicles after the impact. As judges of the facts, you may attribute such weight to the photographs as you deem appropriate taking into consideration all of the other evidence in this case.

In some accidents resulting in extensive vehicle damage, the occupants may suffer minor injuries or no injuries at all. In other accidents where there is no or little apparent vehicle damage, the occupants may suffer serious injuries. In reaching your decision in this matter, you are to give the photographs whatever weight you deem appropriate. They are but one factor to be considered, along with all other evidence, in determining whether the plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of the accident.^{^[1]}

B. Lack of Photographic Evidence

In this case, you have heard testimony regarding the damage to the motor vehicle(s) involved in the accident. The testimony discussed the damage or explained the condition of the vehicle(s) after the impact. (Where applicable: You also heard testimony about the lack of damage to the vehicle(s) from the impact.) As judges of the facts, you may attribute such weight to the testimony about the damage (or lack of damage) to the motor vehicles as you deem appropriate taking into consideration all of the other evidence in this case.

In some accidents resulting in extensive vehicle damage, the occupants may suffer minor injuries or no injuries at all. In other accidents where there is no or little apparent vehicle damage, the occupants may suffer serious injuries. In reaching your decision in this matter, you are to give the testimony as to the vehicle damage whatever weight you deem appropriate. The testimony is but one factor to be considered, along with all other evidence, in determining whether the plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of the accident.^{^[2]}

Sourcehttps://njcourts.gov/attorneys/civilcharges.html

More information on Personal Injury cases at http://www.njlaws.com

[1] See Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J.18 (2006).

[2]Abdurraheem v. Koch, 456 N.J. Super.496 (Law Div. 2018).

5.33 LIMITATION ON LAWSUIT OPTION WHERE NO BROKEN BONES IN CAR ACCIDENT

5.33 LIMITATION ON LAWSUIT OPTION[1]^,[2](Approved 11/2000; Revised 04/2018)

A. Introduction

In order to recover damages in this case, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he/she sustained injuries which fit into one or more of the following categories:

NOTE TO JUDGE

Charge 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or any combination of them, depending on the proofs in each case.

In cases with two or more defendants, some of whom have available the Limitation on Lawsuit Option defense and others who do not, charge the following:

The jury should answer two specific interrogatories as to each defendant: (1) was this defendant negligent; (2) if so, did the negligence proximately cause plaintiff’s injuries? If more than one defendant was negligent and their negligence proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries, the jury has to find what percentage of the total negligence or fault is attributable to each defendant. Once the jury answers those questions, it should then determine whether or not plaintiff satisfied the applicable threshold which applies to a defendant. Then the jury should affix damages. Bolz v. Bolz, 400 N.J. Super.154 (App. Div. 2008).

1. Death;

2. Dismemberment;

3. Significant disfigurement or significant scarring;

4. Displaced fracture;

5. Loss of a fetus;

6. A permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.

If you find that none of the injuries caused by the accident come within one of these categories, your verdict must be for the defendant. If you find that at least one of the injuries caused by the accident comes within one of these categories, your verdict must be for the plaintiff.

B. Significant Disfigurement or Significant Scarring (Type 3)

(Revised 06/2007)

In this case, the plaintiff alleges and has the burden to prove that he/she suffered a significant disfigurement or significant scarring as a result of the motor vehicle accident. An injury shall be considered a significant disfigurement or significant scarring if a reasonable person would find that the disfigurement or scarring renders plaintiff’s appearance unattractive, objectionable, or as the subject of pity or scorn, or that such condition individually or collectively substantially detracts from plaintiff’s appearance or impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of the plaintiff so as to render the bearer unsightly, misshapen or imperfect deforming him/her in some manner. You shall consider as factors in making this determination the appearance, coloration, existence, size and shape of plaintiff’s disfigurement or scar[s] along with the characteristics of surrounding skin and the remnants of the healing process and other cosmetically important matters.

C. Permanent Injury (Type 6)(Revised 03/2017)

In this case, the plaintiff alleges that he/she suffered a permanent injury as a result of the motor vehicle accident. An injury shall be considered permanent when the body part or organ, or both, has not healed to function normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical treatment.[3]

Plaintiff must prove this claim through objective, credible medical evidence. Objective proof means the injury must be verified by physical examination or medical testing and cannot be based solely upon the plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Credible evidence is evidence you find to be believable.

If you determine that any one of the injuries contended by [Plaintiff] constitutes a permanent injury, then in that event, you should award damages to [Plaintiff], in accordance with these instructions for all his/her injuries that you determine to have been proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant, including those injuries that you find to be non-permanent.[4]

[1] SeeN.J.S.A.39:6A-8a. The Limitation on Lawsuit Option within the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act(AICRA) of 1998 (L.1998, c. 21 and c. 22) (“AICRA”), identifies the following categories: (1) death; (2) dismemberment; (3) significant disfigurement or significant scarring; (4) displaced fractures; (5) loss of a fetus; (6) a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. The effective date of this provision of AICRA is March 22, 1999. Therefore, the Limitation on Lawsuit Option shall apply to individuals who, at the time of the accident, were insured under automobile liability insurance policies issued after March 22, 1999. By way of example, if an individual was involved in a motor vehicle collision on March 23, 1999, but was still covered under a policy issued before the effective date of the statute (March 22, 1999), he or she will be subject to the verbal threshold charge applicable to L.1988, c.119 effective January 1, 1989.

[2] This charge was previously designated as 5.33B. Former charge 5.33A – the verbal threshold charge applicable to L.1988, c.119, effective January 1, 1989 – applied only to individuals covered under policies issued before March 22, 1999 (the effective date of the current statute). In 2018, former charge 5.33A wasdeemed outdated and therefore rescinded. However, to the extent an individual is covered under a policy issued before March 22, 1999, he or she will be subject to the former statute,L.1988, c.119 effective January 1, 1989.

[3] This definition of “permanent injury” is taken directly from the AICRA of 1998, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8. In DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J.477 (2005), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Legislature did not intend to require a plaintiff with a Type 6 injury to prove a “serious or substantial impact” on his or her life in order to pierce the verbal threshold. Therefore, a plaintiff need only prove a permanent injury, as defined in the statute, to recover for non-economic damages.

[4]Johnson v. Scaccetti, 192 N.J.256 (2007).

Sourcehttps://njcourts.gov/attorneys/civilcharges.html

More information on Personal Injury cases at http://www.njlaws.com

5.32C DUTY OF DRIVERS AND PEDESTRIANS CROSSING AT MARKED OR UNMARKED CROSSWALK

5.32C DUTY OF DRIVERS AND PEDESTRIANS CROSSING AT MARKED OR UNMARKED CROSSWALK (Approved 6/10)

In addition to considering the general duty I have just described (Model Civil Charge 5.30 G-2), you are required to consider the following statutory provisions that involve pedestrians crossing at marked or unmarked crosswalks which are part of our New Jersey Motor Vehicle Act. They are referred to in N.J.S.A. 39:4-36 which provides, in part that the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection.

The driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross the road within a marked crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon, or within one lane of, “half of the roadway” upon which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. Half of the roadway means all traffic lanes conveying traffic is one direction of travel, and includes the entire width of a one-way roadway.

No pedestrian shall leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield or stop.

In the event of a collision between a vehicle and a pedestrian within a marked crosswalk, or at an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, there shall be a permissive inference that the driver did not exercise due care for the safety of the pedestrian.

Source https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/civilcharges.html

More information on Personal Injury cases at www.njlaws.com

5.10A NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE – GENERAL Civil Model Jury

5.10A NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE – GENERAL

(Approved before 1984; Revised 01/2019)

1. Negligence may be defined as a failure to exercise, in the given circumstances, that degree of care for the safety of others, which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances. It may be the doing of an act which the ordinary prudent person would not have done, or the failure to do that which the ordinary prudent person would have done, under the circumstances then existing.

[Where a more detailed definition is desired, the following may be used:]

2. Negligence is the failure to use that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances. It includes both affirmative acts which a reasonably prudent person would not have done and the omission of acts or precautions which a reasonably prudent person would have done or taken in the circumstances.

By “a reasonably prudent person” it is not meant the most cautious person nor one who is unusually bold but rather one of reasonable vigilance, caution and prudence.

In order to establish negligence, it is not necessary that it be shown that the defendant had an evil heart or an intent to do harm.

To summarize, every person is required to exercise the foresight, prudence and caution which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. Negligence then is a departure from that standard of care.

NOTE TO JUDGE

Negligence is defined as conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. 2 Restatement,Torts, Sec. 282; Harpell v. Public Service Coord. Transport, 20 N.J. 309, 316 (1956); Prosser, Torts, p. 119.

The defendant's conduct is compared with that which the hypothetical person of reasonable vigilance, caution and prudence would have exercised in the same or similar circumstances or conditions. Overby v. Union Laundry Co., 28 N.J. Super. 100, 104 (App. Div. 1953), aff’d14 N.J. 526 (1954); McKinley v. Slenderella Systems of Camden, N.J., Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 1960).

"The conduct of the reasonable man will vary with the situation with which he is confronted. The jury must therefore be instructed to take the circumstances into account; negligence is a failure to do what the reasonable man would do 'under the same or similar circumstances.'" Prosser, p. 125.

The above may be modified to cover cases involving property damage.

If at trial there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether one or more of the parties performed a discretionary function (subject to a “palpably unreasonable” standard) or ministerial function (subject to “ordinary negligence principles”), N.J.S.A.59:2-3, N.J.S.A.59:3-2, you must tailor both the final jury charge and the verdict sheet so the jury can make the appropriate fact findings and evaluate the party’s liability exposure using the proper standard of care. SeeHenebema v. S. Jersey Transp. Auth., 403 N.J. Super.485, 506-07 (App. Div. 2013), aff’d, 219 N.J.481 (2014).

Monday, January 7, 2019

What to do If Injured in a Hit and Run Accident in New Jersey, Car Accidents, Truck Collision, Motorcycle Accidents, Personal Injury

Kenneth Vercammen & Associates Law Office helps people injured due to the negligence of others. We provide representation throughout New Jersey. The insurance companies will not help. Don't give up! Our Law Office can provide experienced attorney representation if you are injured in an accident and suffer a Serious Injury.
Even the most seasoned driver must be prepared at all times for the unforeseen danger of automobile drivers who are not paying attention to the road. Hopefully you will be able to maneuver around the danger but sometimes you will not be that lucky.
If the other driver stops and exchanges pertinent accident information, you have a good chance of recovering your damages...but what if they don't? There’s a likely chance that you may be involved in a HIT AND RUN at some point. Unfortunately, many drivers currently using our roads are driving without licenses or insurance, or had multiple suspensions. These circumstances make them far more likely to leave the scene of the accident.
If you have been the victim of a hit and run accident, there are a few things that you must remember.
1. An altercation with the “suspect” may result in far more serious problems.
2. If at all possible, get the license plate number of the vehicle.
3. Call 911 immediately. Provide the police with as much information as you can about the other driver. Make, model, color of car, physical description of the driver if you are able to see them, and most importantly, the direction they are traveling. The police may issue a notice to nearby towns to pursue the suspect vehicle and also send a unit to assist you.
4. Talk with as many witnesses as you can. Make sure you ask for their name, address, and telephone number and ask them (beg if you must) to please wait for the police to arrive so that they can give a statement while their memories are fresh.
5. Protect the accident scene. Even the smallest piece of evidence could carry a “signature” of the other driver. For example: lenses from headlights and taillights (often smashed during the accident) carry a code from the DOT that marks the make, model, and year of the vehicle. This evidence will certainly help to narrow the search. Carry a small camera in your car. INSIST to the police to write up a police report.
Increase your uninsured motorist coverage on your insurance. If you are injured in a hit and run, we often are still able to help you obtain money compensation from the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund or from your own insurance company. Most drivers in New Jersey have uninsured motorist coverage to protect them if they are seriously injured in a hit and run accident. Call Kenneth A. Vercammen to schedule an “in-office” consultation. Bring your insurance declaration sheet, insurance policy, and the accident report.