6.14 PROXIMATE CAUSE — WHERE THERE IS CLAIM OF INTERVENING OR SUPERSEDING CAUSE FOR JURY’S CONSIDERATION

6.14              PROXIMATE CAUSE — WHERE THERE IS CLAIM OF INTERVENING OR SUPERSEDING CAUSE FOR JURY’S CONSIDERATION  (Approved 8/99)

Note to Judge

This charge should be given in conjunction with Model Civil Charge 6.12 or 6.13 where there is also a jury question as to whether an intervening or superseding cause brought about the injury or harm. 

          In this case, [name of defendant or other party] claims that the accident/incident/event or plaintiff’s injury/loss/harm was caused by an independent intervening cause and, therefore, that [name of defendant or other party] was not a contributing factor to the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm. 

          An intervening cause is the act of an independent agency that destroys the causal connection between the defendant’s [or other party’s] negligence and the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm.  To be an intervening cause the independent act must be the immediate and sole cause of the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm.  The intervening cause must be one that so completely supersedes the operation of [name of defendant or other party]’s negligence that you find that the intervening event caused the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm, without [name of defendant or other party]’s negligence contributing to it in any material way.[1]  In that case liability will not be established because [name of defendant or other party]’s negligence is not a proximate cause of the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm. 

          However, [name of defendant or other party] would not be relieved from liability for his/her/its negligence by the intervention of acts of third persons, if those acts were reasonably foreseeable.  By that I mean, that the causal connection between [name of defendant or other party]’s negligence and the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm is not broken if the intervening cause is one that might, in the natural and ordinary course of things, be anticipated as not entirely improbable.[2]  Where the intervention of third parties is reasonably foreseeable, then there still may be a causal connection between the defendant’s [or other party’s] negligence and the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm.  The fact that there were intervening causes that were foreseeable or that were normal incidents of the risk created does not relieve the defendant of liability.[3] 

          You must determine whether the alleged intervening cause was an intervening cause that destroyed the substantial causal connection between the defendant’s negligent actions (or omissions) and the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm.  If it did, then [name of defendant or other party]’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm.

Source: https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/civilcharges.html

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     [1]Davis v. Brooks, 280 N.J. Super. 406, 412 (App. Div. 1993). 

     [2]Id. 

     [3]Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 203; Cruz-Mendez v. ISU, 156 N.J. 556 (1999).