Estate of Brandon Tyler Narleski v. Nicholas Gomes (A-9/10-19

 Estate of Brandon Tyler Narleski v. Nicholas Gomes (A-9/10-19) (083169)

Argued March 30, 2020 -- Decided September 17, 2020

ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.

       The issue before the Court is whether the common law imposes a duty on
underage adults -- over the age of eighteen but under twenty-one -- to refrain from
making their homes a safe haven for underage guests to consume alcoholic
beverages and, if so, the standard for liability if an underage guest, who becomes
intoxicated, afterwards drives a motor vehicle and injures or kills a third party.

       Nineteen-year-old Mark Zwierzynski permitted underage adult friends to
consume alcoholic beverages in his home. Nineteen-year-old Brandon Tyler
Narleski and twenty-year-old Nicholas Gomes left the home severely intoxicated.
Shortly afterwards, Gomes lost control of his vehicle and crashed. Narleski died at
the scene. Gomes’s blood alcohol concentration was twice the legal limit.

       Narleski’s parents filed a wrongful death action against Gomes, Gomes’s
parents, and Amboy Food Liquor and News (Amboy), where the underage Narleski
purchased the alcohol. In turn, Amboy filed a third-party complaint against
Zwierzynski. The trial court granted Zwierzynski’s motion for summary judgment,
finding that he did not have a duty to supervise his friends. The Appellate Division
affirmed,  459 N.J. Super. 377, 399 (App. Div. 2019), but set forth a new rule of law
to apply purely prospectively that an underage adult “shall owe a common law duty
to injured parties to desist from facilitating the drinking of alcohol by underage
adults in his place of residence, regardless of whether he owns, rents, or manages the
premises.” Id. at 398. The Court granted Zwierzynski’s petition for certification
and Amboy’s cross-petition.  239 N.J. 493-94 (2019).

HELD: An underage adult defendant may be held civilly liable to a third-party
drunk driving victim if the defendant facilitated the use of alcohol by making his
home available as a venue for underage drinking, regardless of whether he is a
leaseholder or titleholder of the property; if the guest causing the crash became
visibly intoxicated in the defendant’s home; and if it was reasonably foreseeable that
the visibly intoxicated guest would leave the residence to operate a motor vehicle
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and cause injury to another. The duty the Court recognizes today was foreshadowed
by precedent and therefore will apply in the case of Zwierzynski.

1. Six decades ago, in Rappaport v. Nichols, the Court recognized a common law
cause of action against licensed tavern owners who knowingly serve alcohol to
minors or intoxicated patrons who then negligently drive vehicles causing injury to
third-party victims.  31 N.J. 188, 202-05 (1959). The Appellate Division in Linn v.
Rand extended the rationale of Rappaport to homeowner social hosts.  140 N.J.
Super. 212 (App. Div. 1976). The Linn court held that the social host could be held
liable in negligence for the injuries suffered by a third-party victim if the host served
alcohol to a visibly intoxicated underage guest, knowing that the guest was unfit and
about to drive and that an accident was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 217, 219. In
the seminal case of Kelly v. Gwinnell, this Court expressly approved of Linn and
expanded the doctrine of social host liability to a private residence where an adult
host “serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both that the guest is
intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle.”  96 N.J. 538, 547-48
(1984). In that circumstance, the Court held, the social host will be “liable for
injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle by the adult guest when such negligence is caused by the intoxication.” Id.
at 548. (pp. 17-21)

2. The Legislature largely codified Kelly in enacting the Social Host Liability Act,
 N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5 to -5.8. The Act’s text and legislative history refute any
argument that the Act was intended to replace or stunt the development of the
common law of social host liability in cases where alcohol is provided to intoxicated
minors and underage adults. The Court rejects any interpretation of the Act that
would lead to the absurd conclusion that the Legislature intended to create a
liability-free zone for underage social hosts who knowingly provide alcohol to
visibly intoxicated minors and underage adults who negligently cause injury to third
parties as a result of their intoxication. (pp. 21-24)

3. The Legislature has expressed the State’s strong public policy against underage
drinking by adding to the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice a law punishing
those who supply alcohol to minors and those who make property available for
underage consumption of alcohol. Although  N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17(a) and (b) create
penal sanctions, not tort liability standards, those statutes underscore the policy steps
the State has taken to deter those who might be tempted to accommodate or supply
alcoholic beverages for underage drinking. The Court reviews cases in which the
Appellate Division touched on the potential relevance of criminal statutes in setting
the standard of care for an underage social host who serves alcohol to underage
social guests and the continuing development of social host liability law. The Court
also notes that statistics show drunk driving remains a significant public health
threat. (pp. 25-32)
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4. In determining whether to recognize a duty to refrain from conduct that poses an
unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to others, the Court considers four factors:
“the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and
ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” Hopkins v.
Fox & Lazo Realtors,  132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993). Weighing those factors, the Court
concludes that an underage social host, who makes his residence available and
facilitates underage drinking, has a duty not to knowingly provide or allow self-
service of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest and, if a guest becomes visibly
intoxicated, to take reasonable steps to prevent the guest from operating a motor
vehicle. (pp. 32-39)

5. The Court accordingly establishes the following rule. A plaintiff injured by an
intoxicated underage social guest may succeed in a cause of action against an
underage social host if the plaintiff can prove by a preponderance of the evidence
the following: (1) The social host knowingly permitted and facilitated the
consumption of alcoholic beverages to underage guests in a residence under his
control. This element does not require that the social host be a leaseholder or
titleholder to the property. It is enough that the social host has the ability and
apparent authority to give others access to the property; (2) The social host
knowingly provided alcohol to a visibly intoxicated underage guest or knowingly
permitted the visibly intoxicated underage guest to serve himself or be served by
others. It is no defense that the underage guests bought and brought the alcoholic
beverages that they or others consumed; (3) The social host knew or reasonably
should have known that the visibly intoxicated social guest would leave the premises
and operate a motor vehicle and therefore would foreseeably endanger the lives and
property of others; (4) The social host did not take any reasonable steps to prevent
the intoxicated guest from getting behind the wheel of the vehicle; and (5) The
social guest, as a result of intoxication facilitated by the social host, negligently
operated a vehicle and proximately caused injury to a third party. (pp. 39-40)

6. That rule was foreshadowed and is the logical extension of the Court’s common
law jurisprudence and legislative enactments aimed at combatting drunk driving and
providing fair compensation for its victims. Applying the duty here is also
consistent with the usual rule that the prevailing party who brings a claim that
advances the common law should receive the benefit of his efforts. Based on the
record before the Court, Zwierzynski is not entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. There are material issues of disputed fact that can be resolved only
by a jury. (pp. 40-41)

      REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court.